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BEGGING THE QUESTION: FETAL TISSUE
RESEARCH, THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN
SUBJECTS, AND THE BANALITY OF EVIL
Thomas John Babbo*
INTRODUCTION
Atreus, that wellspring of Greek legend, visited a curse upon his house
following a feast that he gave for his brother and mortal enemy
Thyestes.' The pie that Atreus prepared as the main course of the
*Assistant General Counsel, Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center, Chicago,
Illinois. BA, Loyola University Chicago, 1994; J.D., Loyola University Chicago School of
Law, 1998. The author wishes to thank Max D. Brown for his continuing support and his
assistance in formulating this paper. He also wishes to ackmowledge the invaluable rez--arch
assistance of Catherine DeLair, Mary Anne Boley, Angelina Ristanovic, and Danielle Hilgers;
and also Lisa Lipsky. Most importantly, Mr. Babbo wishes to express his love and gratitude to
his wife, Heidi, and his children, Mary Grace and Joseph.
1See JOINT AsSOCIATION OF CLASSICAL TEACHERS, THE WVo.D OF AT=is: Ati
INTRODUCTiON TO CLASSICAL ATHENIAN CULaIARE 305 (1984). The fall of the house of Atreus
is a favorite subject of many classical Greek tragedies, including the Or--teian Trilo3, of
Aeschylus:
Pelops had two sons, Atreus and Thyestes. Thyestes commits adultery with
Atreus' wife and to punish him, Atreus serves up all but one of Thyeste'
children to him in a pie (Aigisthos survives). Atreus' son Agamemnon has
to sacrifice his own child Iphigeneia in order to get a favorable wind for the
expedition to sail to Troy and win back Helen for his brother Menelaos, and
restore the family honor. When Agamemnon returns, his wife WUutaim :itra
has married Aigisthos and slaughters Agamemnon in revenge for his
sacrifice of Iphigeneia. But Agamemnon's surviving son Orestes returns to
take his due revenge on Klutaimfstra.
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dinner contained a secret ingredient, the meat of Thyestes' butchered
children. 2 Thyestes found this pie absolutely delicious, and, between
each belch and extra helping, begged Atreus for the recipe.3 Waiting
until Thyestes had gorged himself to capacity, Atreus finally disclosed
the true contents of the meal-whereupon Thyestes was consumed by
such violent revulsion and vomiting that he died.4
There exists between this feast of Atreus and the transplantation of
human fetal tissue in federally-sponsored experimentation a certain
resonance. The meal that Atreus served Thyestes was certainly
nourishing, and Thyestes found it particularly delicious. Likewise,
human fetal remains, by virtue of their humanity, promise unique
treatments for such ailments as polio, juvenile diabetes, aplastic
anemia, thymic aplasia, AIDS, leukemia, thalassemia, Hurler's
Syndrome, Parkinson's Disease, Alzheimer's Disease, Multiple
Sclerosis, spinal cord injury, and stroke.5 But whereas Thyestes could
only fully enjoy his dinner so long as he remained ignorant of its
ingredients, we continue to stomach the transplantation of aborted fetal
remains. Current federal law and regulations upon experimentation
involving human fetal tissue,6 as well as the proposed regulations
regarding human fetal stem cell research,7 allow us to create a class of
humans not deserving of the protections afforded to other subjects of
research, living and dead.
And yet, when taken as a whole, the entire body of federal
regulations regarding clinical research articulates a notion of the human
person wholly inconsistent with federal fetal tissue policy. This article
will show that the view of the human person adopted by the regulations
for the protection of human subjects borrows in large part the concept
2See id.3See id
4See id.
5See Chrysso Barbara Sarkos, The Fetal Tissue Transplant Debate in the United States:
Where Is King Solomon When You Need Him?, 7 J.L. & POL. 379, 400 (1995); Joanna H.
Kinney, Restricting Donative Choice: Fetal Tissue Transplantation and Respect for Human
Life, 10 J.L. & HEALTH 259, 262-63 (1996).
6See 42 U.S.C. § 289 (1994).
7See NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, DRAFT NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH
GUIDELINES FOR RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN PLURPOTENT STEM CELLS (Dec. 1, 1999)
<http://www.nih.gov/news/stemcelllfactsheet.htm> [hereinafter NIH GUmELNES].
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of humanity utilized by the Nuremberg Code--a definition that is
itself provided stark relief by the medical experiments for which the
8See THE NuRmBERG CODE, TRIAS OF WAR CRIMNALS BEFORE TE NURemBEG
MILIARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONMOL COUNcIL LAW No. 10 181-42 (1949) [hereinafter
NUREBNERGTAIS].
1. The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely
essential. This means that the person involved should have leal
capacity to give consent; should be so situated as to be able to
exercise free power of choice, without the intervention of any
element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, over-reaching, or other
ulterior form of constrain or coercion; and, should have sufficient
knowledge and comprehension of the elements of the subject
matter involved as to enable him to make an understanding and
enlightened decision. This latter element requires that before the
acceptance of an affirmative decision by the experimental subject
there should be made known to him the nature, duration, and
purpose of the experiment; the method and means by which it is
to be conducted; all inconveniences and hazards reasonable to be
expected, and the effects upon his health or person which may
possibly come from his participation in the experiment
The duty and responsibility for ascertaining the quality of the
consent rests upon each individual who initiates, directs, or
engages in the experiment. It is a personal duty and
responsibility which may not be delegated to another with
impunity.
2. The experiment should be such as to yield fruitful results for the
good of society, unprocurable by other methods or means of
study, and not random and unnecessary in nature.
3. The experiment should be so designed and based on the resul of
animal experimentation and a knowledge of the natural history of
the disease or other problem under study that the anticipated
results will justify the performance of the experiment.
4. The experiment should be so conducted as to avoid all
unnecessary physical and mental suffering and injury.
5. No experiment should be conducted where there is an a priori
reason to believe that death or disabling injury will occur;,
except, perhaps, in those experiments where the experimental
physicians also serve as subjects.
2000]
DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW [Vol. 3:383
Nazis were prosecuted following the Second World War.9 This article
will then illustrate how the fetal tissue regulations fail to adopt this
view of the human person, and instead maintain an artificial blindness
to the humanity of the aborted fetus. The practical effect of this
deliberate ignorance is the creation of a class of human beings for
whom the customary precautions and formalities followed in clinical
research do not apply. Finally, in light of the above, this article argues
for the renewed ban of fetal tissue research, both for the sake of
philosophical consistency with the vast body of federal human subject
protections and to avoid the creation of a scientific environment that
denigrates the humanity of any class of persons.
6. The degree of risk to be taken should never exceed that
determined by the humanitarian importance of the problem to be
solved by the experiment.
7. Proper preparations should be made and adequate facilities
provided to protect the experimental subject against even remote
possibilities of injury, disability, or death.
8. The experiment should be conducted only by scientifically
qualified persons. The highest degree of skill and care should be
required through all stages of the experiment of those who
conduct or engage in the experiment.
9. During the course of the experiment, the human subject should be
at liberty to bring the experiment to and end if he has reached the
physical or mental state where continuation of the experiment
seems to him to be impossible.
10. During the course of the experiment, the scientist in charge must
be prepared to terminate the experiment at any stage, if she has
probable cause to believe, in the exercise of the good faith,
superior skill, and careful judgment required of him that a
continuation of the experiment is likely to result in injury,
disability, or death to the experimental subject.
Id.
9See NUREmBERG TRIALS, supra note 8, at 181-82.
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BACKGROUND
The Influence of the Nuremberg Code and its Progeny on
U.S. Regulation of Medical Research
At the end of the summer of 1947, in the then-West German city of
Nuremberg, a panel of three American jurists sat in judgment over
twenty-three Nazi physicians and bureaucrats.' 0 The defendants in
United States v. Karl Brandt et al.n stood accused of conducting grisly
medical experiments upon Jews, Gypsies, the mentally retarded, and
prisoners of war. 12 The experimental atrocities read like a litany of
horrors: to determine how long a person could live without fresh water,
subjects were forced to drink seawater until they desiccated completely;
to learn how long a Luftivaffe pilot might survive if shot down over the
English Channel, subjects were immersed in icy water until they slowly
froze to death; to observe the effects of bailing out of an airplane at
high altitudes, subjects were placed in vacuum chambers and allowed
to burst.'3 Other Nazi experiments included: exposing subjects to bio-
warfare agents, infecting subjects with pathogens and disease, testing
new sterilization and castration methods, and transplanting limbs and
bones onto healthy subjects. 14
In handing down its ruling, however, the Nuremberg tribunal went
far beyond merely condemning the defendant Nazi doctors for war
crimes and atrocities. ' Rather, to prevent the reemergence of the kind
of scientific environment under which Nazi research thrived, the final
judgment in Brandt enumerated ten conditions upon the practice of
medical experimentation, the so-called Nuremberg Code.
16
Significantly, the Brandt court derived these principles not from an
'°See idi
"See U.S. v. Karl Brandt 11 TRIALS OF WAR CumzALs BEFORE THE Ntrmrr.O
MtLrARY TRmUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNcILLAW No. 10 171,174(1950).
'
2See id
13ROBERTN. PROcToR, THENAZI DocToRs AND THE NuRet.mERG CoDE: Hu.tm1RIGI-rS
IN HUMAN EXPEIMNTATION 25 (Annas G. & Grodin M. eds., 1992).
'
4See id at 26.
15See NUREmBURGTRAIAS, supra note 8, at 95-102.
'
6See id at 102-03.
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existing code of medical ethics, nor from precedential case law, but
rather from the "natural law" of all human persons.
17
The most influential of the Nuremberg Code's conditions, holding
primacy above the others both in number and importance, was the
necessity of obtaining authentic, uncoerced informed consent from
human subjects.' 8 All codes and regulations to follow concerning the
rights of human research subjects, both ethical and regulatory, would
import this notion of informed consent with varying degrees of
strictness and success.19 For instance, at the signing of the Charter of
the United Nations (UN) in December 10, 1948, the UN's fifty-one
original signatory nations adopted the provisions of the Nuremberg
Code, if only in principle.
20
In 1953, the Clinical Center of the National Institutes of Health
(NIH) produced the first U.S. federal policy regarding research on
human subjects, adopting for its intramural research program the
Nuremberg Code's emphasis on the use of healthy, competent
volunteers in clinical research.2 1 According to promotional materials
published by the NIH at the time, the Clinical Center's guidelines
viewed the Nuremberg Code as the "ten commandments" of human
medical research.22 Pursuant to these directives, the Clinical Center
mandated that the human subject of medical research be "considered a
member of the research team and.. .afforded an understanding suited to
his comprehension of the investigation contemplated, particularly any
potential danger to him."23
The next year, during its 8th General Assembly, the World
Medical Association (WMA) proposed its "Principles for Those in
7See PROCTOR, supra note 13, at 181-82.
8See id.
19Jesse A. Goldner, An Overview of Legal Controls on Human Experimentation and the
Regulatory Implications of Taking Professor Katz Seriously, 38 ST. Louis U. L.J. 63, 91-92
(1995).205ee UNrE NATIONS, HUMAN RiGHTS: QUESTIONS & ANswERs 47-54 (1987).21See Guidelines for the Conduct of Research Involving Human Subjects at the National
Institutes of Health Appendix 1 (1995) <http://heILx.nih.gov:8001/ohsr/guidelines.phtml>.
22See LEONARD GLANZ, INFLUENCE OF THE NuREmBERG CODE ON U.S. STATUTES 185
(Annas G. & Grodin M. eds., 1992).
23See Karine Morin, The Standard of Disclosure in Human Subject Experimentation, 19
J. LEGAL MED. 157, 173 (1998).
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Research and Experimentation" (Principles). 24 The WMA Principles
introduced notions of surrogate or substituted consent by a subject's
next-of-kin or legal representative into the Nuremberg Code's informed
consent model.25 Ultimately, these Principles would lead to the
WMA's promulgation of the Declaration of Helsinki at its 18th World
Assembly in 1964.26 Heeding the wishes of the medical research
establishment,2 7 the Declaration's "Recommendations Guiding Doctors
in Clinical Research" softened the strident, legal statements of the
Nuremberg Code.28 Instead, the Declaration of Helsinki stressed that
its "standards as drafted [were] only a guide to physicians."
29
By order of priority, the Declaration of Helsinki placed scientific
expertise and the goals of medicine3" before the informed consent of
the research subject.31 In fact, the Declaration does not require
physicians to obtain informed consent at all for clinical research
considered "therapeutic" to the subject.3 2 However, the Declaration of
Helsinki could not avoid the influence of the Nuremberg Code.33 In
sections 9 and 10 of its Basic Principles, the Declaration articulates the
policy of authentic, uncoerced informed consent voiced by the
Nuremberg Code, and proposes procedures to obtain such consent3 4
24See Erik Husmarth, Occupation Health Services in Sweden, WOrLLD M ED. J. 14-15
(1955).
2SSee id at 16.
26See GEORGE J. ANAS & lMICHAEL A. GRODIN, THE NAZI DOTORS AD THE
NURE~MURG CODE 331-342(1992). Vo LDElDICALASsOcIATON DECLARATION oF
HEINmm: RE.COMsNDATiONS GuiDwnG MEDICAL DocroRs N BIoMEDicAL R;sEA.cc
INVOLVING HUmN SUBJECTS (1964), as revised by the World Medical Assembly in Tokyo,
Japan, 1975, in Venice, Italy, 1983, and in Hong Kong, 19S9 [hereinafter Declaration of
Helsinki].
27see GEORGE J. ANNAS, THE NURnemERG CODE IN U.S. CoUrTS: EThcs vs.
EXPEDIENCY 204-05 (Annas G. & Grodin M. eds., 1992).
2For a detailed discussion of the application of the Nuremberg Code to civil and
criminal law, see GEORGE J. ANNAS, INFORMED CONSENT TO HtMW.4 ETERM9N"rATION: THE
SUBJECT'S DImLMA 20 (1977).
29See Declaration of Helsinki, supra note 26, at 331.
30 ee id at § I, 1-3; § 1,1 ; § 111, 1.31See id at § I, 9-11.
32See id at § IL 5.33See Declaration of Helsinki, supra note 26.34See id at § I, 9-10:
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The Declaration of Helsinki, primarily because of its non-legal,
advisory nature, received wide acclaim from the medical community.
For instance, in a panel discussion reported in the YALE JOURNAL OF
BIOLOGY AND MEDICINE in 1964, one physician described the
Nuremberg Code as "...a wonderful document to say why war crimes
were atrocities, but.. .not a very good guide to clinical investigation
which is done with high motives. 35 Henry Beecher, the noted Harvard
physician and advocate for research subjects, saw the Helsinki
Declaration as liberating Western medicine from "...the imposition of
the Nuremberg Code."3  In 1966, the American Medical Association's
Ethical Guidelines for Clinical Investigators endorsed the legally
unenforceable presentation of the Declaration of Helsinki over that of
the Nuremberg Code.
37
During that same year, both the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) and the NIH promulgated policies and
regulations dealing with the rights of human research subjects.38 The
FDA established its 1966 regulations pursuant to the Drug
Amendments Act of 1962.39  Passed in response to the tragic birth
defects that resulted from pregnant women taking the experimental
9. In any research on human beings, each potential subject must be
adequately informed of the aims, methods, anticipated benefits, and
potential hazards of the study and the discomfort it may entail. He
or she should be informed that he or she is at liberty to abstain from
participation in the study and that he or she is free to withdraw his
or her consent to participation at any time. The physician should
then obtain the subject's freely-given informed consent, preferably
in writing.
10. When obtaining informed consent for the research project the
physician should be particularly cautious if the subject is in a
dependent relationship to him or her or may consent under duress.
In that case the informed consent should be obtained by a physician
who is not engaged in the investigation and who is completely
independent of this official relationship.
35See ANNAS, supra note 27, at 204-06.36See id.37See Goldner, supra note 19, at 91.
3 See id39See id.
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anti-nausea medication, Thalidomide, 40 the Drug Amendments Act
required the FDA to establish informed consent procedures sufficient to
ensure that patients would only take investigational new drugs with full
knowledge of any hazardous side effects. In promoting these new
regulations, statements by the FDA reflected the trend of medical
researchers throughout the 1960s toward promoting the Declaration of
Helsinid over the Nuremberg Code.
42
Yet, in its definition of informed consent, the 1966 FDA
regulations imported far more actual language from the Nuremberg
Code than from the Helsinki Declaration. This borrowing is still
apparent in the current incarnation of the FDA regulation entitled,
"Informed Consent of Human Subjects," last amended March 8, 1999:
[N]o investigator may involve a human being as a subject in
research covered by these regulations unless the investigator
has obtained the legally effective informed consent of the
subject or the subject's legally authorized representative. An
investigator shall seek such consent only under circumstances
that provide the prospective subject or the representative
sufficient opportunity to consider whether or not to
participate and that minimize the possibility of coercion or
undue influence.
43
As for the NIH, its 1966 guidelines expanded to extramural
investigations the protections of human subjects that it had imposed
upon intramural research in 1953. 44 Under the 1966 Public Health
Service Policy Regarding the Protection of Human Subjects, the NIH
would only approve extramural research grants of those institutions
with an internal board that would review the protections afforded the
research subject.45 These protections were to include the provision of
informed consent to human subjects in a manner open to scrutiny by
40See id41See GLANZ, supra note 22, at 186.42See Morin, supra note 23, at 171.
43See 21 C.F.R. § 50.20 (1999).
4"See id45See id
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the internal review board.46 This 1966 NIH policy was the harbinger of
the current practice of Institutional Review Boards required by federal
regulation.
The NIH guidelines and FDA regulations continued to receive
revision and amendment through the early 1970s.47 In 1974, reports of
unethical research involving human fetuses around the world and of
secret deliberations about undertaking similar research within the
NIH48 led to the enactment of the National Research Act.49 Passage of
this law required the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(DHEW), the predecessor agency to Health and Human Services,
(1-IHS) to codify into federal regulation the NIH guidelines on the
protection of research subjects.5  The National Research Act also
created the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects
of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, whose charge was to study the
ethics of biomedical research in general, 51 and of fetal research in
particular. 52 Pending the National Commission's report on the moral
propriety of human fetal research, Congress placed a moratorium on all
research related to the human fetus, living or dead. 3
The National Commission issued its Report and
Recommendations: Research on the Fetus on July 25, 1975. 54
Underlying the findings of this report were the Nuremberg Code, the
Helsinki Declaration, and the views of ethicists, legal scholars, medical
researchers, and theologians.55  In light of the U.S. Supreme Court's
ruling in Roe v. Wade, the National Commission's Report avoided an
overt declaration of the "personhood" of the fetus. 56 Nevertheless, the
46See NIH GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at 7.47See Morin, supra note 23, at 172, 174.48See Sarkos, supra note 5, at 390.49See National Research Service Award Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-348, 88 Stat. 342.
'
0See id § 202(a)(1)(B)(v).
"
1See id. § 202(a).52See id § 202(a)(3).
3See id. § 202(a)(3)(b).
5'See United States National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of
Biomedical and Behavioral Research: Report and Recommendation: Research on the Fetus,
DHEW Pub. No. (OS) 76-127 [hereinafter National Commission].
5 See id. at 3.
56See id. at 26-27.
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Commission firmly established that the fetus was to be considered a
human subject in the context of medical research:
Throughout the deliberations of the Commission, the belief
has been affirmed that the fetus as a human subject is
deserving of care and respect .... [T]he members of the
Commission are convinced that moral concern should extend
to all who share genetic human heritage, and that the fetus,
regardless of life prospects, should be treated respectfully and
with dignity.5
7
The National Commission's Report then went on to issue sixteen
conclusions, 58 which were adopted on July 29, 1975 as federal
regulation, and remain so to this day.59 Recognizing the inherent
vulnerability of the fetus, these regulations adopt wholeheartedly the
provisions of the Nuremberg Code,60 and establish a bifurcated analysis
for permissible research on the human fetus.61 For any fetus in utero,
the regulations permit only research that (1) will benefit the health of
the fetus, and (2) will pose no more than minimal risk to the fetus. 62
An ex utero fetus may never serve as a research subject, as any such
research would either artificially maintain the life of the fetus or hasten
his or her death.63
So completing the first aspect of its congressional mandate, the
National Commission continued with its evaluation of the ethics of
medical research generally.64 Deliberating for a period of nearly four
years on such considerations as the difference between research and
medicine, the role of risk-benefit analyses in medical research, the
selection of research subjects, and the nature and importance of
informed consent, the National Committee finally issued its findings on
57See id at 61-62.
'Id at 73-76.
59See Sarkos, supra note 5, at 390.
69See GLANz, supra note 22, at 189.61See id
62See 45 C.F.R. § 46.208(a)(1)(s) (1999).
6'See 45 C.F.R. § 46.209 (1999).
"See Sarkos, supra note 5, at 399-408.
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April 18, 1979.65 Contained within The Belmont Report. Ethical
Principals and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of
Research (the Belmont Report), these findings recognize three basic
underlying ethical principles which ought guide the actions of medical
researchers: (1) respect for persons, (2) beneficence, and (3) justice.66
The Belmont Report did not see its purpose as providing
researchers a rationale for its ethical directives of respecting persons,
doing good, and upholding justice.67 In fact, the National Commission
purposefully avoided definitions that might answer the threshold
questions: "What is a person?" and "What makes a person deserving of
respect, beneficence, and justice?' 68 Rather, by promulgating its basic
ethical principles, the Belmont Report provided what could be
described as the "regulatory" counterpart of the Nuremberg Code. 69 In
its introduction, the Belmont Report establishes its function as
elucidating the principles of the Nuremberg Code, and the Declaration
of Helsinki by implication, through the interpretive "lens" of
categorical moral imperatives:
70
This code [the Nuremberg Code] became the prototype of
many later codes intended to assure that research involving
human subjects would be carried out in an ethical
manner .... The codes consist of rules, some general, others
specific, that guide the investigators or the reviewers of
research in their work. Such rules often are inadequate to
cover complex situations; at times they come into conflict,
and they are frequently difficult to interpret or apply.
65See The Belmont Report, 44 Fed. Reg. 23192-23197 (1979) [hereinafter The Belmont
Reporl 
,See id. at 23193-94.
671d.
68/d
691d
7 The use of this term here is intentional, signifying the Kantian undercurrents of the
Belmont Report. See Ruth Macklin, Universality of the Nuremberg Code, in THE NAZi
DOCTORS AND THE NuREMBERG CODE 245 (George Annas & Michael Grodin, eds. 1992);
IMMANUEL KANT, THE FOuNDATIoNs OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (1785). To further
strain my "regulation" metaphor, I submit that Kant's philosophy, which postulates concepts
within the mind that structure our perception of reality, is itself regulatory-i.e., providing an
organizational framework for the dictates of experience.
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Broader ethical principles will provide a basis on which
specific rules may be formulated, criticized, and interpreted 7'
For instance, the Belmont Report interpreted the Nuremberg
Code's penultimate requirement of informed consent in terms of its
ethical principle, "respect for persons."72 According to the Belmont
Report, this principle incorporated at least two basic assumptions: (1)
that human beings are generally autonomous, and (2) that individuals
with diminished autonomy require protection.73 In deference to this
general notion of autonomy, the Belmont Report's guidance with
regard to informed consent required that the researcher provide the
subject with sufficient information, in a manner suitable to the subject's
level of comprehension, so that the subject could freely decide to enroll
in a given study.74 For those subjects with diminished autonomy, like
children or the mentally disabled, the Belmont Report added to the
above the additional requirement of seeking permission for enrollment
from those in a position of protecting the subjects, i.e., the subject's
parents or guardians.
The "regulatory" character of the Belmont Report allowed it to
integrate itself far more easily into the format of federal regulation than
the unequivocal commandments contained in the Nuremberg Code. In
light of the findings of the Belmont Report, as well as those found in
similar reports by the National Commission concerning research on
pregnant women, children, the mentally disabled, and prisoners, the
Department of Health and Human Services76 (DHHS) began work on
revising its regulations in 1979.
77
Two years later, on January 26, 1981, DHHS promulgated new
regulations concerning research on human subjects. 73 For the next
twelve years, these regulations governed only research sponsored by
7tSee The Belmont Report, supra note 65, at 23192-93.
72See id at 23193-94.
73See i at 23193.
7 4See id at 23193-94.
75See id. at 23193.
76The DHHS succeeded the DHEW.
riSee NIH GUIDMEiNE, supra note 7, at Appendix 1.
7"See 46 Fed. Reg. 8386-91 (1999).
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DHHS.79 However, on June 18, 1991, sixteen federal agencies,
including the FDA, the Department of Defense, and the Department of
Energy, incorporated the regulations of DHIHS into their own codes
regarding the protection of human subjects.80  As such, these
regulations, 45 C.F.R_ § 46, effectively govern all federally sponsored
research, as well as any commercially-sponsored research conducted on
behalf of pharmaceutical companies and medical device
manufacturers. '
The current federal regulations establish three basic mechanisms
to ensure the protection of research subjects:
(1) federal regulatory oversight of a research facility's "project
assurance" by DHIS's Office for the Protection of Research
Risks (OPRR),
(2) internal approval of studies by a federally-sanctioned
Institutional Review Board (IRB), and
(3) voluntary informed consent for human subjects. 82
Of these, the operative regulatory mechanism is the requirement for
authentic, uncoerced informed consent-the oversight of OPRR and the
approval of an IRB merely providing the government the opportunity to
check compliance.8
3
The federal regulations outline the federal government's general
requirements for the informed consent of research subjects. 84
Accordingly, the researcher may only enroll those subjects who have
consented to participation in the study based on full disclosure of the
following:
"
9See id
"
0See 56 Fed. Reg. 28003-29 (1999).
"tSee 45 C.F.1. § 46.101 (1999).
2See Gary B. Ellis Ph.D., Protecting the Rights and Welfare of Human Research
Subjects, J. ASS'NMED. C. 1008, 1019 (1999).
"
3See id.
"See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a) (1999).
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(1) the treatments or procedures utilized in the study are
experimental;
(2) these treatments or procedures involve a number of
reasonably foreseeable health benefits, risks, and discomforts;
(3) the subject's condition may be alleviated by other approved,
non-experimental treatments or procedures;
(4) the subject may contact an identified individual with any
questions regarding the study, including any questions regarding
medical treatment in the event of a study-related injury; and
(5) the subject's consent to participate is entirely voluntary,
specifically allowing the subject the option to refuse or
discontinue participation in the study, at any time, without loss
of benefits. 8
Additionally, the researcher must inform the subject (1) whether he or
she will receive any financial benefits by participating in the study; and
(2) whether, in the event of a study-related injury, he or she will receive
any medical treatment.
8 6
In addition to the heightened protection of unborn research
subjects promulgated by the National Commission in 1975, current
federal regulations impose more stringent informed consent standards
upon the enrollment of other "vulnerable populations," such as women,
children, and prisoners.S7  Because of the possibility that a female
research subject may become pregnant, 45 C.F.R § 46.116(b) requires
that the researcher include in the consent of women of childbearing
potential any known risks to the fetus, and a statement that some risks
to the fetus may be unforeseeable.88 For women who are in fact
pregnant, sections 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.207 and 46.208 restricts enrollment
SSSee 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.116(a)(1) to (4), (8) (1999).
s6see 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.116(a)(6) to (7) (1999).
87See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.205, 46.206, 46.207, 46.301, 46.302, 46.303, 46304, 46.305,
46.306,46.401, 46.402,46.403,46.404,46.405,46.406, 46.407, 46.40S, 46A09 (1999).
"
8See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(b)(1) (1999).
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to studies involving only minimal risk, due to dangers to which the
woman's unborn child might be exposed. 89
With regard to children, Subpart D of 45 C.F.R. § 46 affords
additional protections dependent upon the risks and benefits inherent in
the research. 90 For research on children that involves no more than
minimal risk, the researcher need only abide by the slightly higher
informed consent standard set forth in 45 C.F.R. § 46.408.91
Borrowing the view of the Belmont Report that the child research
subject falls under both the regulatory protection of the government and
the natural protection of parents, 92 this regulation requires that the
researcher seek the consent of the child's parent or guardian, and of
both parents if possible.93 If the child is old enough to understand at
least some of the risks of the research, 45 C.F.R. § 46.408 requires that
the researcher obtain the assent of the child in addition to the consent of
the child's parent or guardian.
If a research protocol would expose a child to anything more than
minimal risk, the regulations require the IRB at the researcher's
institution to submit the proposed study to a risk-benefit analysis. 94 In
cases where the investigational treatment or device might benefit the
child, the IRB must determine whether the risks are warranted and the
benefits are at least as favorable as those presented by approved
treatments. 95 However, where the research poses no benefits to the
child, the IRB's risk analysis must show that the risks pose only a
"minor increase over minimal risk.",
9 6
Recognizing the severe constraints upon freedom imposed by
incarceration, 97 45 C.F.R. § 46, Subpart C affords to prisoners
protections rivaled only by those offered to the fetus in utero.98 This
subpart restricts even the subject matter of research on prisoners,
89See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.207 to 208 (1999).
9°See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.401 to 409 (1999).
9 1See 45 C.F.R. § 46.404 (1999)
92See GLANZ, supra note 22, at 194.
93See 45 C.F.R. § 46.408 (1999).
94See d
95See 45 C.F.R. § 46.405 (1999).
9 6See 45 C.F.R. § 46.406 (1999).
9 7See 45 C.F.R. § 46.302 (1999).
9 8See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.305 to 306 (1999).
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allowing only studies of criminality, the psychological and social
effects of incarceration, health problems particular to prison
populations, and only such innovative treatments which have a
reasonable probability of improving the health of the incarcerated. 99
An IRB reviewing such research must assure that prisoners are not
unethically induced to participate in research studies with promises of
better quality food, accommodations, or health care.1
00
ANALYSIS
Nuremb erg Metaphysics:
Implicit Definitions of the Human Person in Both the
Nuremberg Code and Federal Regulation
On February 17, 1994, President Clinton issued an executive
memorandum to the heads of all federal departments and agencies that
undertake or fund research involving human subjects, urging these
departments and agencies to strictly enforce the provisions of 45 C.F.R.
§ 46.101 In this memorandum, Clinton described the history of the
protection of human subjects, from the Nuremberg Code to the current
federal regulations, as a continuum:
Since 1947, when guidelines for research with human
subjects were promulgated, there has been increasingly
widespread recognition of the need for voluntary and
informed consent and a scientifically valid design of
experiments involving human subjects....
Over time, this recognition has evolved into a rigorous and
formalized system of regulations and guidelines, which were
codified in governmental policies on human subject research,
and were included in the former Department of Health,
Education and Welfare's regulations in 1974, 45 C.F.R § 46.
In 1991, 16 agencies formally adopted the core of these
99See 45 C.F.RL § 46.306 (1999)100See 45 C.F.R. § 46.305 (1999)
'O'See 45 C.F.tR § 46.305(a)(2) (1999).
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regulations in a common Federal Policy for the Protection of
Human Subjects.
The kind of evolution to which the President refers would
necessitate a common view of the research subject between the 1947
Nuremberg Code and the 1991 C.F.R. 10 2  The Nuremberg Code's
derivation from natural law theory provides the basis for this
consistency. To discover this common view of the human person, we
must examine what the Nuremberg Code's ten directives imply
concerning the nature of humanity and the practice of scientific
research. In other words, the ruling in Brandt can provide us the
answer to the underlying question, "Why protect individuals who act as
research subjects?"
The answer to this question begins in the Nuremberg Code's
primary tenet: the requirement that medical researchers obtain
uncoerced, authentic informed consent from all research subjects. 103
To so require informed consent presumes that human beings are
generally capable of making choices based on the use of reason. Stated
in terms of inherence, having the capability to make decisions means
that human beings by nature possess an intellect and a free will.
The remaining provisions of the Nuremberg Code place this
notion of the freely-acting, intellectual human person in the context of
medical research. °4  For instance, the Nuremberg Code's second
provision states that "[t]he experiment should be such as to yield
fiaitful results for the good of society, unprocurable by other methods
or means of study, and not random and unnecessary in nature."105 So
following the "absolutely essential"'1 6 requirement of informed
consent, this provision places both medical progress and the good of
society subservient to the dignity of individual human persons.
07
1°2See Memorandum for the Vice President, the Heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies, Subject: Review of Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects
<http://grants/nih.gov/grants/oprr/humansubjects/guidance/lhsdc94feb.htm>.
S3 See Nu tmOm TRLALS, supra note 8.
'°4See id
'O°See id.
'°6See id.
107See GLANTZ, supra note 22, at 197 (referencing the conclusions of Nuremberg
Tribunal):
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The protections afforded to research subjects under 45 C.F.R. § 46
further this view of the Nuremberg Code of the human person as an
inherently free-thinking and dignified creature.' By requiring that
researchers provide subjects full disclosure of a study's benefits, risks,
and discomforts, and by allowing research subjects the ability to cease
participation in a study at any time without penalty, the general rules
for informed consent show respect for both the intellect and the free
will of the research subject. 09 The additional protections afforded to
the unborn, children, and prisoners under the federal rules exhibit a
recognition on the part of the federal regulations that impairments of
freedom or intellection do not serve to dilute the dignity of the research
subject."0 Rather, 45 C.F.R. § 46 requires heightened protection in the
face of a human subject's increased vulnerability." '1
And yet, these considerations do not complete the portrait of the
human person painted by the Nuremberg tribunal. In order to fully
comprehend the view of the human person articulated by the
Nuremberg Code, we must look back to the atrocities which the
Nuremberg tribunal prosecuted. The science practiced by the Nazis
and its philosophical underpinnings provide stark relief and surprising
support to the view of the Nuremberg Code as to the worth of the
human research subject.
In the interest of the advancement of medicine and science, the
Nuremberg defendants took advantage of a social and political
environment that declared particular minority groups unworthy of the
law's protection." 2 Despite all the rationalizations used by the Nazi
doctors in their own defense-the lack of moral absolutes in the context
Thus, the judges concluded that even if research is good, it is an
optional good that must be balanced against respect for human beings.
which is not optional but mandatory. Where the welfare of human
beings is threatened by research, the research must not be done.
d
"'See 45 C.F.R. § 46.101 (1999).
'O°See id
"
0 See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.205 to 46.211 (1999) (unborn children); 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.301 to
46.306 (1999) (prisoners); 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.205 to 46.409 (1999) (unborn children).
"'See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101 to 46.409 (1999).
"
2See NURmURO TRIALS, supra note 9.
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of "total war,)113 the impending death of subjects awaiting execution,
the excuse of "just following orders"' 14 -the actions of Brandt and the
other Nazi researchers clearly articulated one belief: the permissibility
of sacrificing to science the life and dignity of any minority declared
"inferior" by the state.
11 5
Yet, if we examine the Nazi experiments in terms of the goals of
medical research, we find that the Nazis, by their very exploitation of
the humanity of their research subjects, voiced simultaneously an
inadvertent admission of these subjects' inherent value. In other words,
the scientific merit of the Nazi doctors' experiments derived precisely
from the humanity of the research subjects whose personhood these
researchers denied. In response to this perverse rearrangement of
values, it was the mission of the Nuremberg Code to make certain that
scientific utility and medical advance never again took precedence over
the dignity of the human person.11 6
Federal Law and Regulation Regarding Fetal Tissue
Transplantation: Begging the Question
Yet, despite the consistent tradition of respect for human persons
transmitted from the Nuremberg Code through the federal regulations,
at least one area of medical research finds itself strangely exempt. The
1 3 See Arthur Z. Caplan, The Doctors' Trial and Analogies to the Holocaust in
Contemporary Bioethical Debates, in THE NAzI DocTORs AND THE NUREMBERG CODE 266-67
(George Annas & Michael Grodin eds., 1992).
"
4See id.
"Ssee id. at 266-68.
"
6See Jay Katz, Human Experimentation and Human Rights, 38 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 7, 9
(1993). Specifically, Professor Katz states:
What transpired at Auschwitz and Tuskegee would not have led to
regulations of the human experimentation process had these events been
viewed as isolated occurrences, ascribable to causes utterly distinct from
ordinary contemporary research practices. The regulations were a
response to contemporary research. They were also a response to the
realization, questioned by some, that reliance on the ethical conscience,
inculcated in physician-investigators during their medical education,
provided insufficient protection to the human rights of subjects of
medical research.
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practice of fetal tissue transplantation operates to place the
advancement of medical science in a position of mastery over the
dignity of the human person. Whereas the body of federal research
regulations incorporate the Nuremberg Code's concept of human
dignity, current federal policy regarding fetal tissue research has the
effect of both eroding our societal intolerance for evil and denying our
universal concept of humanity.
The historical origins of federal fetal tissue policy began with the
regulations promulgated by NIH pursuant to the National
Commission's Report in 1975." Comparatively, the National
Commission's Report allotted very little space and analysis to the use
of fetal tissue in research.'1 8 Nevertheless, the National Commission's
recommendation to permit research on human fetal remains, in a
manner "...consistent with local law, the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
(UAGA)," 9 and commonly held convictions about respect for the
dead was incorporated into the body of federal regulations. 2 1
However, the two paragraph discussion contained in the National
Commission's Report failed to develop a sufficiently detailed analysis
as to the application of the UAGA to the donation of aborted fetal
tissue.122 At the time of the National Commission's Report, the UAGA
was a fairly recent development.123  In fact, only years earlier,
American law dealt with organ donation and transplantation through
existing common law concepts.12
4
In harvesting organs from the living, the physician was required
by the common law to obtain informed consent from the donor, or else
face a claim of "medical battery."' 25  After death, matters became
"
7See National Commission, supra note 54.
"Ssee id
"
9See 45 C.F.R. § 46.210 (1999) [hereinafter UAGA].
'
20See National Commission, supra note, at 54.
'
21See 45 C.F.R § 46.210 (1999).
"2See National Commission, supra note 54, at 75.
'7See Eric S. Jaffe, She's Got Bette Davis[s] Eyes: Assessing tho Nonconsnsual
Removal of Cadaver Organs Under the Takings and Due Process Clause, 90 CoLm.L L. REV.
429, 532-33 (1990).
'
24See id at 535.
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somewhat more complicated. By will or by contract, one had the right
to dispose of one's own body, but only within the confines of social
propriety. 126 In lieu of testamentary instructions by the decedent, state
courts would also recognize a so-called "quasi-property" right in the
family of a decedent: the right to possession of the cadaver in an
undisturbed condition for the purpose of proper burial of the cadaver in
a manner consistent with the wishes of the decedent.
127
In 1965, when organ transplantation was becoming more
commonplace, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
Law began to organize and modify these common law and statutory
sources to directly address the circumstance of organ donation. 128 By
1968, the Commissioners had developed the UAGA, which, as of 1971
had been adopted by all fifty states and the District of Columbia.
129
125See Edwin H. Pratt v. Parmelia J. Davis, 224 Ill. 300 (1906), Kenneth Gaskin v.
Michael Goldwasser, 66 Il. App. 3d 996 (1988); Kus v. Sherman Hosp., 643 N.E.2d 1214 (I11.
App. 1995).
126See Michael H. Scarmon, Brotherton v. Cleveland: Property Rights in the Human
Body-Are the Goods Oft Interred with Their Bones, 37 S.D. L. Rev. 429, 437-38 (1992), Jaffe,
supra note 122, at 542.
'
27See id. at 439-42
128See National Commission, supra note 54.
129See ALA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 22-19-40 to 22-19-74 (Michie 1975 & Supp. 1999);
ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.50.010 to 13.50.090 (Lexis 1999); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-34-101
to 12-34-109 (West 1996 & Supp. 1999); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 16 §§ 2701 to 2726 (Michic
1974 & Supp. 1998); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 2-1501 to 2-1510 (Michie 1999); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 732.910 to 732.922 (West 1995 & Supp. 2000); GA. CODE. ANN. §§ 44-5-140 to 44-5-151
(Michie 1991 & Supp. 1999); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 50/1 to 50/9 (West 1992 & Supp.
1999); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 29-2-161-1 to 29-2-16-10 (Michie 1989 & Supp. 1999); KAN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 65-3209 to 65-32818 (1993 & Supp. 1999); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 311.165
to 311.247 (Michie 1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 17.2351 to 17.2359 (West 1982 & Supp.
2000); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 §§ 2901 to 2910 (West 1992 & Supp. 1999); MD. ANN.
CODE. ART. ESTATES & TRUSTS §§ 4-501 to 4-512 (Michie 1991 & Supp. 1999); MASS. GEN.
LAWS. ANN. CH. 113 §§ 7-14 (West 1996 & Supp. 1999); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. §§
333.10101 to 333.11101 (West 1992 & Supp. 1999); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-39-31 to 41-39-
53 (1972); NEa. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 71-4801 to 71-4820 (Michie 1998); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
26:6-57 to 26:6-63 (West 1996); N.Y. PuBuc HEALTH LAW §§ 4300 to 4309 (McKinnoy
1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 130A-402 to 130A-412.2 (Michie 1999); OHIO REv CODE ANN. §§
2108.01 to 2108.99 (West 1998); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63 §§ 2201 to 2218 (West 1997); 20
PA. CODE §§ 8611 to 8624 (1975 & Supp. 1999); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-43-310 to 44-43-460
(Law. Co-op 1985); S.D. CODIFMD LAWS §§ 34-26-20 to 34-26-47 (Michie 1996 & Supp.
1999); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 68-30-101 to 68-30-402 (West 1996 & Supp. 1999); TEx. REV.
Civ. STAT. ANN. ART. HEALTH & SA1Eiy CODE §§ 692.000 to 692.016 (,Vest 1992 & Supp.
[Vol. 3:383
FETAL TISSUE RESEARCH
The UAGA specifically granted the right of an individual to donate, via
a testamentary document, all or part of the individual's body upon
death.130 In the absence of such documented testamentary intent, the
UAGA set up a hierarchy of individuals who could donate a decedent's
organs in an extension of the common law "quasi property" right
granted to the decedent's family. 13 1 In such situations, however, as
Professor Alexander Capron noted in the National Commission's
Report, 132 the right of a decedent's family to donate a decedent's
organs under the UAGA must be seen in light of common law notions
of informed consent. 1
33
In the context of donating fetal tissue, however, the mother of an
unwanted, aborted fetus does not share the same status as a family
member under the common law or the UAGA. 134 By acting to end the
life of her fetus, the mother has essentially renounced her maternal
interest with respect to the fetus, and consequently has not the standing
to provide surrogate consent for the fetus for the purpose of organ
donation. 135 Furthermore, state common law and statutory views of the
standard of care required from a surrogate decision maker require the
surrogate to consider the best interests of the patient 
136
Prior to 1985, federally-funded research on the dead fetus was
comparatively scarce, and largely non-therapeutic. 131 Thereafter,
research involving human fetal remains began more and more to take
the form of transplantation of fetal tissues into adult research
subjects. 138 The premise for these investigations was that fetal tissue,
due to its immunological naivete, can incorporate itself without
2000); UT. STAT. ANN. tit. §§ 5238 to 5251 (1987 & Supp. 1999); W. VA. CODE §§ 16-19-1 to
16-19-9 (Michie 1998); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 157.06(1-12) (West 1997).
130See UAGA, supra note 118, at 33-34.
"'See id at 40.
132See National Commission, supra note 54, at 25.
133See id at 25-29.
134See id at 25.
M3See id at 26-29.
136See 755 Il1. Comp. Stat. Ann. §§5/119 to 17 (West 1999); In re Estate of Greenspan,
558 N.E. 2d 1194 (1990); Matter of Vicic's Estate, 398 N.E. 2d 420 (1979); Matter of Estate
of Robertson, 494 N.E.2d 562 (1986); Proehl v. Leadly, 230 N.E. 2d 516 (1967).
137See Sarkos, supra note 5, at 400.
'3sSee id
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rejection into the tissues of diseased adults.139 Technically, all fetal
remains, including those resulting from miscarriage, could similarly
resist rejection from the donee. 140 However, researchers prefer to use
fetal remains which are the most intact, statistically healthy, and
recently dead.141  As such, fetal tissue for transplantation generally
comes as the result of elective abortions, with caesarian section
abortions providing the method most scientifically advantageous. 1
42
In the next several years, articles began to appear in the popular
press raising the concern that, in order to obtain optimal fetuses for
transplantation, researchers might induce the relatives of potential
transplant recipients to become pregnant for the sole purpose of
abortion. 143 Concurrently, similar concerns by officials within the NIH
led to an internal moratorium on the funding of fetal tissue transplant
research pending a review concerning the morality of this research by
an external advisory group. 144 Among the issues to be considered by
this group was the morality of utilizing fetal tissue from induced
abortions and whether donation of fetal tissue would encourage
abortion. 1
45
On September 14, 1988, the Human Fetal Tissue Transplantation
Research Panel (Panel) convened to begin what resulted in a six day
deliberation of the issues. 146 Three months later, the majority of the
Panel issued its findings, proclaiming as a matter of public policy the
moral permissibility of fetal tissue research. 147  In arriving at this
conclusion, the Panel's majority made the following argument: (1)
because Roe v. Wade148 made abortion legal in the U.S., and (2)
'
39See id,
M4°See iii
141See id.
142See Gregory Gelfand & Toby R. Levin, Fetal Tissue Research: Legal Regulations of
Human Fetal Tissue Transplants, 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 647, 650-54 (1992).
143See Thorne, Trade in Human Tissue Needs Regulation, WALL ST. J., Aug. 19, 1987, at
16, col. 3; Maugh, Use of Fetal Tissue Stirs Hot Debate, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1988, at 1, col.
1; Colbum, The Fetus: Medicine, Law, and Morality, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 1988, (Health), at
17, col. 2.
1'"See Sarkos, supra note 5, at 403.
1455ee id.
146See id. at 406.
147See id.
14See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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because fetal tissue transplantation promises considerable medical
gains, then (3) transplantation of fetal remains is appropriate so long as
the decisions, respectively, to abort and to donate are kept separate.14 9
By making this argument, the Panel abandoned the reasoning
adopted consistently from the Nuremberg Code, from the National
Commission's Report to all other current federal regulation, for an
"end-justifies-the-means" utilitarianism. I50 As we have seen, all of
these previous works premised their protections on a view of the human
research subject as inherently dignified, and then developed regulations
designed to support that dignity.151 The Panel majority, however,
deliberately avoided the issue of fetal worth, 5 2 choosing instead to
focus on the scientific benefit of fetal tissue transplantation.'
53
The findings of the Panel would ultimately provide the structure to
current federal law governing fetal tissue transplantation, although not
until January 22, 1993.' On that date, President Clinton lifted the ban
instituted by the NIH in 1988, which was previously upheld by
executive order through the Reagan and Bush administrations. SS
President Clinton's directive was incorporated into federal law by the
NIH Revitalization Act of 1993, sponsored by Sen. Edward Kennedy,
and enacted by the President on June 10, 1993.56
The NIH Revitalization Act of 1993 added section 498A to the
Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. § 289g-1). 5 7 Pursuant to this
section, a woman may donate the remains of the fetus that she has
aborted for use in transplantation research, but may not receive any
remuneration in cash or in kind for the donation of her aborted child." 3
When, in the euphemism of the law, "providing the tissue," the woman
must assert the following in a signed, written statement: (a) that she has
149See Sarkos, supra note 5, at 406.
'
59See id
'See 58 Fed. Reg. 7457 (1993).
'
52See Sarkos, supra note 5, at 406; Joanna H. Kinney, Restricting Donative Choic=:
Fetal Tissue Transplantation and Respect for Human Life, 10 J.L. & HEALTH 259,259 (1996).
'5See Sarkos, supra note 5, at 406.
'mSee id
155See 58 Fed. Reg. 7457 (1993).
'
5See National Institutes of Health Revitalization Act, Pub. L. No. 103-43.
'57See 42 U.S.C. §§ 289g-1 - 3 (1994).
'Ssee 45 C.F.R. § 46.206(b) (1999)
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donated the fetal tissue for use in fetal tissue transplantation research,
(b) that she made the donation without any restriction regarding the
identity of individuals who may be the transplant recipient of the tissue,
and (c) that she has not been informed of the identity of any such
recipients. 59
Additionally, the law prohibits the researcher, the abortionist, the
prospective donee, and any other "individual involved in the research"
from having any influence on (1) the woman's decision to abort, (2) the
timing or method of the abortion, and (3) the determination of viability
of the fetus. 160 The abortionist must also sign a written affidavit which
verifies the above and the following: (1) that the woman gave her
consent to the abortion prior to her consent to the donation, (2) that the
abortion was performed in accordance with applicable State law, and
(3) that the abortionist has disclosed to the woman his financial interest
in providing the fetal tissue to the researcher. 161 Finally, the researcher
must put procedures in place to prevent transplantation of the fetus into
a blood or adoptive relation.162
The effect of current U.S. policy on fetal tissue transplantation is
the maintenance of a formalistic ignorance between the mother of the
aborted fetus and the donee. These "protections" seem merely intended
to silence specific criticisms, without addressing underlying issues. For
instance, the temporal separation of the choice to abort and the choice
to donate eliminates the possibility that a woman's intention to abort
will be influenced by -considering the social benefits of fetal tissue
transplantation. Furthermore, the prohibition against paying the mother
for her donation of the aborted fetus prevents an unseemly dead fetus
market. Finally, the ban on donation of fetal tissue to relations serves
to prevent the distasteful practice of becoming pregnant only in order to
abort the fetus for donation to a loved one.
The prevention of these situations notwithstanding, the fetal tissue
law and regulations give no consideration to the view of the human
'
59See 42 U.S.C. § 289g-l(b) (1994).
'6°See 45 C.F.R § 46.206(a)(3) (1999).
16tSee 42 U.S.C.A. § 289g-l(c) (1994).
'
62See 42 U.S.C.A. § 289g-2(b)(2) (1994).
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person articulated by the remainder of 45 C.F.R. § 46.'63 As such, the
fetal tissue laws and regulations append a caveat to the protections
afforded to human subjects.'6" Valid informed consent must still be
obtained from the majority of research subjects: general informed
consent for healthy subjects, and more protective versions of informed
consent for pregnant women, living fetuses, children, and prisoners.
65
However, because the unwanted fetus is "going to die anyway," and
this death is legal, the fetal tissue regulations allow researchers to take
advantage of this situation for the advancement of medicine. The
aborted fetus is thereby given the status of an exploitable minority.
CONCLUSION
Divorced from a definition of fetal worth, the fetal tissue law and
regulations serve merely to assuage taboo, to spare us the nausea of
Thyestes. But this is neither the mission nor the history of legal
restrictions on the practice of research. Beginning with the Nuremberg
Code, the United States started a tradition of placing the human person
above scientific progress and medical advance. The Declaration of
Helsinki, the National Commission's Report, and the Belmont Report
all support this view-affording respect and protection universally to
all human beings, born and unborn, healthy and impaired, free and
imprisoned. The current 45 C.F.R. § 46 did support this view until
1993 when the Clinton administration introduced a discordant view of
humanity into the regulations: that a specific class of human beings,
unwanted aborted fetuses, are not worthy of the same respect as other
human beings.
Disparate and inconsistent provisions are no stranger to the law.
However, regulations of medical research need philosophical
consistency in order to prevent abuse of the research subject. A
renewed ban on the practice of fetal tissue transplantation by Congress
would provide this consistency, and would prevent similar
discrimination against other classes of persons.
'6See iL
164See id
16'See id
2000]
410 DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW [Vol. 3:383
